Tuesday, January 22, 2008

On exit strategies

Following up on the Liebermanley Report, it's worth noting that contrary to some coverage, the report's recommendations don't really appear to call for an extension that's either indefinite or unconditional.

What's odd about the report, though, is the complete disconnect between its overall themes and its specific recommendation. As expected, the report is rife with "stay the course" language, implying that any type of withdrawal would be "premature" and would have catastrophic consequences both for Canada and for Afghanistan.

But that background couldn't conflict more starkly with the specific recommendation to end Canada's Kandahar rotation if another country doesn't contribute an extra battalion to the effort. In effect, the report concludes that withdrawal is entirely justified if the status quo can't be changed fairly drastically - without explaining how that recommendation fits with its broader analysis.

Now, Adam Radwanski may be right in theorizing that the goal is to push another country into giving in to the demand. But contrary to what the report seems to assume, there's little particular reason to think that Canada has the clout to succeed in that effort - at least unless Liebermanley knows something the general public doesn't about the intention of other NATO countries.

In the meantime, the status of other countries' involvement figures to become a hot topic in Canada - and if nobody meets the demand, then the voices for withdrawal from within Canada may only become louder as a result of the report. Which means that Harper's attempt to rig the panel result may well have backfired, sowing the seeds only for exactly the result the group was hand-picked to avoid.

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